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Appellant submits the following Reply Brief in response 
HPC>iJUlldent's Brief in response to Respondent's Brief-.. 
VESTED PROPERTY INTEREST CANNOT BE CREATED 
BY STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS WHEN IT UNDERMINES 
AND DESTROYS PUBLIC POLICY ON UNCLAIMED 
PROPERTY AS ESTABLISHED BY THE LEGISLATURE 
THROUGH A LAW PASSED SUBSEQUENT TO PASSAGE 
OF THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS. 
In 1957 the Utah Legislature in effect repudiated tne 
aoctr1ne of escneat by establisning and endorsing a new concept 
Known as tne Uniform Disposition of Unclaimed Property law. 
Tnis, in etfect, requires all corporations or business holding 
tJnds or property belonging to an owner they cannot locate, to 
cum it over to tne Utan State Treasurer. He, basically, "stands 
in tne snoes of the owner" and holds for him. 
Owners or tneir neirs wno file claims are paid and tne 
unclaimed balance is used for public purposes by being deposited 
11, cne Uniform School Fund. Owners or heirs, without any 
1 1m1ration of time, may come forward and claim a refund of all 
Lnat is being neld. A trust fund nas been established 
sutt1c1ently large to enable all claims to be paid. In the case 
er money orders casned Dy Travelers Express after having Deen 
reported as unclaimed property and the funds paid in, repayment 
w111 ne made oy tne Treasurer's Office upon submission of the 
Jsned money order. 
While the basic question to De deciaea in l!iis ca~l ,. 
wnetner the six-year Statute of Limitations a]:Jplies, or wneliicr 
the later passed law setting a seven-year preswcJ:Jtion of 
abandonment statutory period overrules tne six-year perioo. 
However, a deeper underlying question is really wnetner tnc 
Uniform Unclaimed Property Law can be circumvented and puol1c 
policy De thwarted Dy the use of tne Statute of Limitations c0 
permit corporate escneat. 
A basic concept is tnat esc/leat is not rav0reo in tt1t 
law. Recently lD...J;D.e_ fulJ;J;~L .Ql_ J.:.b.e_ £.;.;J;.i;1.t.l"_.9.LY.l'J;-"J_ .K..;iJ:.Z- Y .s;.u1y; . 
.9.ll.Q_lJ.iU.Ql.O_.:r~_.KQ._t..<;;_,_~~~.Q...S.eJJ, 659 P.2d 1052 (Utan 1983J tn1s 
court overruled a past preceaent to give an estate to neirs wn0 
snowed up many years after escneat ordinarily occurrea. If liie 
c0urt upnolds tne respondent in tnis case, it will De per::.11:tln", 
even affirming, tne aoctrine at escneat in a aifferent lut~, 
namely corporate escneat. 
Corporate escneat, ii 1-'ermitted, will aivert tunas tr: 
public purposes, and ultimately from owners or ne1rs JUSt aQ 
effectively as public escneat will aivert runds tro1,1 ow:1er~ d: 
tneir neirs. 
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TRAV HERS EXPRESS COMPANY, INC. MAY NOT 
BE SELECTIVE IN APPLYING STATUTE OF 
LIMITATIONS ONLY TO STATE AND NOT TO OTHER 
CMNERS SUBJECT TO UNCLAIMED PROPERTY ACT, 
ANlJ NOT APPLYING TO OWNERS WHO CASH MONEY 
ORDEKS AFTER SIX YEARS. 
Tne appellants contend that when money orders are 
u~cnaseu and issued that they are subJeCt to the six-year 
3catJte C>t Limitations, and tnat at tne end of six years, the 
,,1uer nas a vested rignt in tne funds. 
Two cjuestions immediately come to mind. ( l) Is 
Travelers Express Company taking the position that all of its 
.:.011e 1· oruers sold witnin the State of Utan are good for only six 
,,t:ctrs? (2) Will Travelers Express Company refuse to casn any 
~~e1 ucuer older tnan six years for any customer? 
A resounding "no" answer is so oovious tnat it nardly 
.. eeus to ue mentioned. Nownere in the record is tnere any 
h1uer1ce tnat money orders are not nonored by Travelers Express 
arcer s1x 1ears, except tnose claimed oy tne State Treasurer 
"'"Jer tne Unclaimed Property Law . No time limits are ever 
. ruc~nt to tne buyer's attention. 
H wner1 ar1/ time barred money ofders nave been cashed older than 
Tne defense of the Statute of Limitations may not be 
,.,crtP~ a~ainst tne State of Utan, and tnen waived against 
"•·ll~t s ut money orders wno present them for payment after six 
. ""rs. Tu Ee issuing company cannot observe a douole standard. 
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This principle was the central point in tne 
case o t ..S.Q.U.tlL.C.il..I.Ql..i.w_.l'.i>.~_ .C.QJIUIU.S.S.i.QD... .Y .. _ .l:U;.1 .. U:i.o;>.Ql.J.1:.il..D 
L.if~_J.D..s.l.U~~-.C.Qlll.Ji>.il.~, 221 S.E.2d 522 (1975). 
It is clear from tne records tnat the 
respondent would never atte,npt a rorfei tu re 
against a policy holder, and that tne point 
is now raised only as against the Tax 
Commission. The derivative nature ot the 
Commission's rights under the act must be 
considered. If the owner of presumed 
abandoned property has any rignts, which are 
conceded by Metropolitan, these rignts accrue 
in their entirety to tne commission. 
1~1:.I.Q~.Ql.J.1.il.D...ID~-.D.Q1:_~_ij.j.,y~-..l1:.S_~.Qil.t.J.~~_t_u~J 
J..i.~.D.1.S _ _il._s_j;.Q_J;J.l.e.S~-~.Ql.J.~.J.~.S-~~~D.S1:_1:.D~ 
~.Ql..i.~~.D.Ql.d.s;.r.s~_.<Jll.d..1~D...~.Di.Q.I~~-1.D.Q.S~-.S~ 
J..i.~D.t.s_.i>.~~.u.s.t_J;D.f'_.l'.il.~-.C.Q.!!\11\i.S.S.J..QD. (Ernpnasis 
added. l 
The case further stated ••. "Botn in law and eyuity 
forfeitures are abhorred, but by tne s~"e token waivers are 
favored." 
The same would oe true of rorfeitea money oraers to 
Travelers Express. It would bring about corporate escneat. On 
tne other hand, the waiver doctrine would protect the funds for 
the true owners, and would be returnee to the owner by tne State 
Treasurer wnen claimed. 
Also, anotner case applying the waiver doctrine statea: 
It is prooable that the banK would never 
attempt sucn a forfeiture againsc a 
traveler's check purchaser, and that tne 
point is now raised only as againsc tne 
concroller. If tnis is so, the derivacive 
nature of tne controller's rights under tne 
act must be oorn in mind. If tne owner of 
presumed aoandonea property has any rignts, 
those rights accrue in tneir entirety to the 
controller. .l'D.f'_~~nk_ID~_.D.QJ;_~£U.Y~_.J.J;.s 
~.Q.D1:J.i>.~1.U.I~l_J.J.~D1:.s_~.s _ _t.Q_~-~.U.I~~~.J._.Qf 
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1~£\Y~l~I~~-_i..:l;l&_i..:~~J-~1D~.ll...~lllQI_i..:~_1.il.Q~~ 
~~~-Ii~D1~-.Q...S-~~i.ru>1_1D.e-~1~1~-~-1D.e 
_i..:QD1IQll~I· (Emphasis added.) 
nm;_Ql _hID.eii_i..:_R__y_. _ _cI~.D..'>1QD, 252 Cal.App.2d 208 (1967)-;-
The same conclusion was reacnea in a "money order" 
ca;o.e. See .CQiy _ _y_._GQl~.ll....S1~1.e_B~~. Cal.App., 157 Cal.Rptr. 
5Jb, 95 CA.3rd 360. 
court oi Rnode Island, June 17, 1982. Mr. Justice Albert E. 
DeR00010 after reviewing tne evidence and nearing arguments in a 
summary Judgment hearing stated tne following in a transcript of 
~1s reasons for nis decision as follows: 
A waiver is a voluntary and intentional 
relinquishment of a known rignt, claim or 
privilege. . . • Tnis court concurs with the 
findings of the California court in the case 
ot XI~~l~I~-£~~I~~~ against .CQI~, number 
77-l086R, decided January 8, 1980, that 
Travelers nas waived such a service charge. 
And I quote the language from that case, 
"Since tne controller's rignts under 
California's Unclaimed Property Law are 
derivative and he succeeds to wnatever rights 
tne owners of abandoned property have, the 
waiver of service charges by plaintiff as to 
the owners in any event def eats any rignt 
Travelers might seek to assert against the 
controller." 
The court's order signed by Justice DeRobbio on July 
1482 stated: 
#4. Travelers Express has never attempted to 
collect tnese service cnarges from owners or 
payees of the money orders regardless of when 
presenced for payment, but has instead 
followed a practice of waiving such charges 
to all except the state. 
- ~ -
In the present case on appeal, Travelers Ex!,Jress r11 ai 
not waive its assertion of the Statute of Limitation against 
indiviaual money order owners and not waive this right against 
cne Seate Treasurer. 
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY DEMONSTRATES THAT THE 
UTAH UNCLAIMED PROPERTY ACT SUPERSEDES THE 
RUNNING OF THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS. 
Tne original unclaimed property law passed in 1957 d1a 
not specifically, mention money oraers, al tnougi1 we maintain tnat 
tney were covered by Section 78-44-8, U.C.A. (1953) which coverea 
"all intangible personal property not otherwise covered by this 
act." 
legislative intent of covering money orders when the specific 
words "money orders" were included. Tnis was two years after 
Section 16 of the Uniform Act dealing with the Statute of 
Limitations was omitted at tne passage of the Uniform Unclaimeo 
Property Act in 1957. 
Tne Legislature certainly would not nave amended in 
tnese words tnrougn passage of a specific Dill if it would nave 
been a useless and meaningless gesture. It woula nave oeen 
totally witnout purpose if the Legislature nad intended to 
continue to recognize tne six-year Statute of Limitations. 
Tnis 1959 amendment snows tne clear intent of the 
Legislature that money orders were to be covered oy tne uncla1mec 
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, ,,;_•ei ty law, and that companies issuing money orders must report 
, 11 ,,,:cc lnat were uncashed for seven years. 
Thus, the principle of legislative intent ar_g_ued 
excensively by respondents in tneir brief tnat tne Statute of 
L1mitat1ons was intended to supersede the effect of the Unclaimed 
Pruperty Act nas been totally demolished by tne 1959 amendment, 
~,aru-:ularly in reference to money orders. Therefore, the 
exter,s ive quute from the case of ..S.t~.t.e_.Qf_.l.J.t.alL.e..lL.r.e.l .. _.fl_g~.e.L.Y .. 
J;:;HJnl.QJ.lD1.ii,in_.f_g.r~.r.J>-.fil;.:>.Q.C.ifil.i.QD, 668 P.2d 503 (1983) is not in 
co1r,c nor applicable. Tne public policy to be concerned about is 
tne unclaimed property disposition policy whicn is a successor to 
tne uld escneat policy, and it has a far nigner priority than 
wllerner tne Statute of Limitations should continue. 
A orief explanation of tne reference to a Bar by the 
Sotute of Limitations in Section 78-44-11(5). u.C.A. (1953) and 
in Re':lulation 110 issued by tne State Treasurer shortly after the 
1~57 act was adopted needs to be explained. 
Tne State Treasurer has always upheld the principle of 
JHl.¢llliJ_y_,_~.clD.t.Q.:>..O, 61 Pac. 901 (Utan) that once tne Statute of 
L1,,•1tations nas fully run, and it nas not been waived, it becomes 
,, vesteo ti':lnt. Tnerefore, in recognizing that the statute nad 
full; run on any property held by a nolder at least six years 
• 1ur to tne 1957 passage of the Uniform Unclaimed Property Act., 
Ju ''tDE:r words before 1951, tnere snould have been placed in tne 
law a passa':le which recognized this right, and stating that such 
wJs not reportable. Tnat was the reason for Section 78-44-11(5), 
- 7 -
